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The Spanish automobile industry had a late start.  Although the country
proved capable of short production runs of high-quality vehicles during the
first third of the century it never managed to build up its own industry, unlike
Great Britain, France, or Italy.  What then, were the critical shortcomings that
prevented the establishment of large Spanish motor manufacturers?  Put
another way, why did all of the companies set up during the first half-century
fail to survive?  This paper attempts to shed some light on these questions,
employing a wide-ranging analysis of both internal and external factors
affecting the industry.  A feeble internal market, lack of resources and
production factors are usually adduced as reasons, as are Spain's general
economic backwardness and the role played by the public authorities.
However, this paper mainly focuses on the internal factors concerning
company strategy and organisation. A comparison with the Italian case helps
put the traditional arguments in proper perspective and highlights those
covering business strategies. Finally, we argue that a broad range of factors
needs to be analysed to fully understand why Spain failed to establish a motor
industry.
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There has been little research on the history of the Spanish motor industry in the first
third of the twentieth-century.  This is not altogether surprising since the industry had
relatively little impact on the national economy during that period. In fact, the industry did
not really take off until the last quarter of the 20th century.
1 Furthermore, it is difficult to
gain access to original material from the few important companies involved. This has
naturally limited scholarly work on the origins of the industry. Our paper  is therefore
based on the literature provided by contemporary observers
2.
This work attempts to answer the question why no large Spanish Motor company
established itself during the first third of the century.  Put another way, why was it that all
of the companies founded during this period ultimately failed?  To answer this question we
have split the history of the motor industry in this period into two sections.  The first
section covers from the turn of the century to the First World War. The second section
focuses on the inter-war years.  During the latter period, new companies wishing to enter
the industry were no longer able to do so under the same circumstances as before 1914.
The 1920s saw the world motor industry entering a period of maturity, however almost all
of the companies on the scene had been founded before the war.  The years before the
conflict were ones of frenetic development and invention for the industry.  The industry
developed rapidly after the war and economies of scale and vertical integration posed
almost insurmountable barriers to entry.  In Spain, none of the firms involved managed to
survive the first period, despite considerable inventiveness and product development. Local
firms were therefore dealt a death blow by the outbreak of war, which marked the
introduction of new manufacturing and sales methods. Spanish manufacturers sought
direct support from the Primo de Rivera Government but this proved too little and too late
to tilt the balance.2
1.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOTOR INDUSTRY AT THE TURN OF
THE CENTURY
Throughout the first decades of the century there was practically no Spanish motor
industry worth speaking of when compared with France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and
even Czechoslovakia and Sweden. As the entrepreneur Arturo Elizalde pointed out, the
lack of a motor industry was due to a combination of causes like: the high cost of
importing special steels; high labour costs; unfavourable exchange rates (which made it
relatively cheap to import vehicles in a country which had done little to protect its incipient
domestic industry); and finally Spanish consumer preference for foreign vehicles, attracted
by low prices and effective advertising campaigns
3.  Observers writing in the 1920s
commented that "vehicles are employed almost exclusively by the well-to-do and are
considered a luxury item, or are bought by rich companies.  Beyond this there are only
coaches (thanks to subsidies) and  vehicles operated by the Royal Mail.”
4 They pointed to
the high cost of petrol, expensive tyres and accessories, and punitive taxes as reasons for
the low penetration of vehicles.
Promoting greater use of motor vehicles during the early years was no easy task given
that cars were thought of as items for sports or leisure purposes, not as a form of
transport. The poor state of the roads also did much to restrict their practical use while the
small size of the domestic market and higher petrol prices hindered the production of
certain accessories. In addition, large sectors of the population were less than enthusiastic
about the new invention and the Government's blinkered tax policy did nothing to further
the industry's development.  Differences in the legal framework adopted by each country
also strongly influenced the way the motor industry developed.
5 Foreign governments took
steps to reduce the taxes paid by motorists in countries where car ownership had shown3
considerable growth. Thus owners in the United States and Great Britain paid a small
annual sum which covered various taxes and duties and was sensibly based on motor size
and vehicle weight.  By contrast, in Spain (where motor-cars were still considered as a
luxury item), it took several years for such changes to be made to the tax system.  It should
be noted that until 1919 vehicles were still covered by a Royal Decree dating from the 28th
of  September 1899 (amending laws of the 30th of June 1895 and the 28th of June 1898).
The legislation naturally concerned horse-drawn wagons and the like. 
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Manufacturers at the time clamoured for the government to increase tariff barriers in
order to stem the tide of imported foreign vehicles. Indeed, at one point France forbade
the import of foreign vehicles altogether.  France slapped a 45 per cent ad valorum tax, and a
19 per cent luxury tax plus a 1.8 tariff coefficient on Spanish vehicles.  The result was that a
Spanish car costing 25,000 Pesetas had customs duties of over 18,000 francs levied on it,
pushing up the sales price to over 75,000 Pesetas whilst a similar French vehicle cost
between 35,000 Pesetas and 40,000 Pesetas.  Moreover, the French government insisted
that all public sector purchases be made from their national industry  for several years.
This policy ensured that weaker companies could soldier on without having to lay off their
engineers and skilled workers.  In Spain, industrialists lobbied for a reduction in taxes,
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complaining that the tariff regime did nothing to help the growth of the motor industry.  It
is particularly difficult to understand the Government’s unsympathetic attitude since
Spanish vehicle manufacturers still met only a fraction of national demand and their woes
were nothing new.
Although local car companies were thin on the ground at the beginning of the 1920s,
one should note that Spain had shown it had the technical know-how to produce
automobiles.4
2.  OPPORTUNITIES AND FOREIGN EXPANSION (1900-1914)
Various reasons are given for the absence of an automobile industry, yet without doubt
one of the most important ones was the small size of the market for goods and problems
with production factors. The small Spanish market was incapable of producing companies
geared up for serial production. A thin market meant paltry demand and a very unequal
income distribution, posing serious obstacles to the establishment of large factories.
8 In
addition, Spain had few natural resources and raw materials had to be imported at much
higher prices than those paid in other car manufacturing countries.
Exports represented an alternative growth strategy for the Spanish car industry.  Several
Italian companies successfully adopted this policy during the first stages of the industry's
development.
9 For example, almost two-thirds of Fiat's production was exported between
1905 and 1907 and the company’s exports represented 60 per cent of total sales at the
beginning of the 1920s.
10
The international motor industry at the beginning of the century was characterised by its
ability to offer extremely innovative products and cutting edge technology.  Vehicles
powered by the internal combustion engine represented a quantum leap in personal
transport. The technology employed and the revolutionary aspects of the new means of
transport gave considerable added value to its products which were eagerly snapped up by
the wealthy.  One can say that cars were an exclusive product aimed at wealthy individuals
who were enticed by innovative, highly sophisticated products.  In other words, the special
features of these vehicles made them objects of desire by an extremely homogeneous set of
consumers which scarcely varied across national boundaries.
11  Cars were therefore aimed
at the wealthiest section of the population.5
A second point which deserves highlighting is the relatively free international trade in
cars during the early years of the industry.  It was not until several years later that
governments began to realise the economic, social, and military importance of motor
vehicles.  When the truth dawned on them, governments acted swiftly to protect their
respective national industries.  Thus Elizalde, writing in 1925, pointed out that "a powerful
Spanish motor industry would help protect the country in case of war. It would not only
provide transport of men, munitions and food but could also be easily converted to
produce aeroplane motors, cartridges, and artillery pieces".  Exports were therefore
virtually an automatic aim for motor companies in their quest to take production out of the
realm of craft skills and into mass production. This strategy was pursued up until at least
the First World War  and, in certain countries, after it.  This was not an easy aim to pursue
given logistic problems (distribution network, after sales service, stock levels, etc.).
12
A third aspect concerns the capital requirements of the industry. Despite the highly
technical and innovative features of automotive products, the capital needed to set up
business did not initially present a serious barrier to entry.  Although access to funds
represented a significant advantage, production, based as it was on craft skills, could be
started with slender internal resources which could be boosted later by ploughing back
profits and obtaining outside finance.
13  In addition, relatively low barriers to entry were
favoured by the lack of interest in the new industry by big business.  Probably existing
industrial groups were too rigid in their approach to business to appreciate the pace of
change in the car industry and the opportunities which it represented.
In Great Britain, for example, it was not particularly difficult to get into the industry in
the early years. A general knowledge of technical engineering and a small amount of capital
was all that was needed. Thus engineering companies, particularly those manufacturing
bicycles, were well-placed to make cars.  However, the first companies which entered the6
industry failed to hit upon a system of standardised, interchangeable components - unlike
their American counterparts. The first British company had to make their own
components, which meant much higher capital requirements than would have applied if
they had been able to rely upon ancillary industries for these items. This manufacturing
approach meant short production runs and expensive products. Many of this first wave of
manufacturers failed to keep abreast of the rapid pace of technical development or were
wiped out by stiff competition. Nevertheless, most of today's important manufacturers
were founded before 1914
14.  In Spain some of the leading companies, like Hispano Suiza,
adopted a similar strategy to British manufacturers, opting for vertical integration and short
production runs of luxury cars.
In Czechoslovakia (then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) exploitation of internal
combustion powered vehicles began early.  There, it was strongly linked with three
industries: (1) railway wagon and carriage building; (2) bicycle manufacturing (Laurin &
Klement in Mlada Boleslav, which later became the SKODA car factory; and (3) the
PRAGA machine company.
15 Car production in Czechoslovakia prior to the outbreak of
the First World War represented an important industry. In the Spring of 1906 there were
208 cars  in Bohemia alone (of which 69 were in Prague).  There were 3000 cars in
Bohemia and Moravia on the outbreak of war in 1914. During this period the Czech motor
industry exported a large part of its total production, and its vehicles were exhibited with
considerable success abroad.  Czech vehicles also won many international races and rallies,
particularly L&K’s products.  During the inter-war period companies began a process of
concentration and firms like PRAGA, TATRA, and SKODA occupied leading positions in
the industry, followed by smaller volume enterprises like AERO, JAWA, WALTER,
WIKOV y CZ (Ceskoslovenska Zbrojovka).  Around 1923 there was a growing trend to
build smaller vehicles at which point cars  came to be considered as a means of transport7
rather than mere playthings for the rich.  This trend became even more pronounced with
the slump of the early 1930s.
Basically, entering the motor industry during the first decade of the 20th century seemed
only to require boundless faith in future growth and the necessary technical skills for
building cars.  The corollaries of these technical skills were manufacturing flexibility and a
commitment to technological experimentation – both vital if one was to stay abreast of the
advances being made in the main producing countries  (initially France and Germany, and
later the United States).
The car industry had a strong international vocation from its inception, both with regard
to supply and demand. From the supply side, vehicles represented a complex product
which incorporated a whole range of contemporary technologies which underwent
continual innovation and production improvements.  No company could hope to stay at
the forefront of the new industry in technological and productive terms unless it was
prepared to keep abreast of the latest international advances. Companies needed to make
the most of foreign know-how as part of a process of imitation favoured by international
competition.  Similarly, on the demand side, the impetus towards internationalisation
stemmed from the small size of domestic markets and the homogeneous nature of
customers.  At this stage of the game, one could sell abroad if one had a good product.
Furthermore, no expensive modifications were required to meet specific customer
demands.
This two-pronged convergence towards an international market was particularly evident
in Europe, given the strong links between sporting and commercial success.  For example,
Hispano-Suiza's promotion in the early years was based on advertising its products through
participation in sporting competitions both at a national and international level.
16.  Sporting
success was vital, given that the development of motor companies was strongly linked to8
their ability to sell their goods abroad and thereby tap a sufficiently large volume of
demand.  Exports were important to Europe in general, but particularly so for Italy and
Spain whose domestic markets were much smaller than those in England, France or
Germany.
The clearest exponent of this international strategy was Fiat.  Founded in 1899, Fiat was
not only notable for being one of the first motor companies on the scene but also for its
sound capitalisation and commitment to industrial production.  It made substantial
investments in plant and equipment and carried out a process of vertical integration which
was entirely new in Italy.  However, what really set Fiat apart from its Italian competitors
was its commitment to competing in international markets.  This strategy led Fiat to a
stronger presence in international competitions and the production of a range of vehicles
providing different features to suit every pocket. The company also took part in trade fairs
and made contacts with foreign component producers since these were technically ahead of
their Italian counterparts.
The difficulties involved in devising and executing a successful growth strategy became
obvious, with some companies achieving rapid development and others succumbing
quickly to the first serious setback.  A kind of vicious circle set in for unsuccessful
companies in which those unable to access the international market failed to achieve the
production volume required to continue building vehicles.  Firms which did not have a
sound industrial base and commercial infrastructure simply lacked the wherewithal to reach
international markets.  Fiat was the only Italian company between the turn of the century
and the outbreak of the Second World War which managed to meet this challenge. Lancia
and  Alfa Romeo also tried to attain this international dimension but without any great
success. In Spain, no company managed to overcome this barrier. Thus  Hispano-Suiza,9
which on the eve of the First World War was the best-placed Spanish company to
undertake mass production, nevertheless failed to make the grade.
It should be recalled that the history of the motor car in Spain began at the same time as
in other countries.  There was a rise in engineering industry in Catalonia towards the end of
the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century. Cheaper energy provided greater
industrial flexibility and reduced dependence on foreign energy sources. In addition,
increasing incomes helped the development of consumer goods industries in Catalonia. As
Maluquer de Motes notes: “growth in the metal industry during the first decades of the
20th century was higher than average and the sector was becoming increasingly important
within the industrial sector.”
17 E. la Cuadra y Cía was the first factory to produce electric
cars in Barcelona, beginning its activities in 1900.  The company failed but one of its
creditors took over the firm's machinery and skilled staff to establish a new company, F.
Castro y Cíal, to manufacture petrol engined vehicles.  It was from this company that
Hispano Suiza emerged in 1904.  The new company drew on the technical staff from the
previous two companies, acquired new machinery, and successively extended its plant.  The
company built a car and aero engine factory in Barcelona in 1911. Hispano Suiza set up a
French subsidiary at the same time, first in Levallois Perret (Seine) and later in Bois
Colombes (Seine).  Another plant was established in Ripoll (Catalonia), where forging,
pressing, and stamping operations were carried out.  A workshop making body panels was
also set up in Barcelona.  Other car brands manufactured in Barcelona at various junctures
included Ideal (Hereter company); David ( David, S.A.) D y G  (Díaz y Grill; the España series
(F. Batlló y Cía.); Nacional Pescara ( Fabrica Nacional de Automóviles, S.A.);  Elizalde models
(Badia, Elizalde y Cía., and later Elizalde S.A.).  However, all these factories factors stopped
making vehicles, even though some of them maintained their workshops.  Elizalde, for
example specialised in manufacturing aero engines from 1925 onwards.  The same can be10
said for the few companies based in other areas of Spain, such as Lazy, Rivas y Cía. in
Mallorca
18, Izaro and Grandier in Madrid and Bilbao, and Calvo y Cía in Amorebieta.
Adopting a thoroughgoing international strategy meant that the whole technical and
managerial culture had to take on an international dimension. Nevertheless, it was
impossible for Spanish companies to imitate everything being done in France or Germany.
The different economic and business climate abroad made certain initiatives much riskier
and more expensive for Spanish companies than for their foreign competitors, thus ruling
out certain options.
Many successful motor companies were founded by inventors whose technological
research led them into entrepreneurial ventures aimed at commercially exploiting their
work.  However, sporadic industrial initiatives promoted by technicians in Italy and Spain
proved unsuccessful.  It is likely that  these pioneers were hampered by their narrow
technical orientation to the detriment of the industrial vision needed for business success.
These technicians were often obsessed with producing the "perfect" car (in which they
were no doubt influenced by their training), losing sight of vital production and commercial
considerations in the process. Engineers tend to consider the technical challenges of
building vehicles to the exclusion of everything else. Hence the danger of trying to produce
original products at any cost and underestimating the problems involved of taking a vehicle
from the prototype stage through to mass production.
Unlike Spanish companies and the majority of Italian ones, one of Fiat's strong points
was precisely its commercial outlook. Put another way, the company's founders were more
interested in selling cars than making them, thus while technical excellence and design were
indispensable considerations, they came second to production and commercial issues. This
focus gave the company a crucial lead in correctly identifying business priorities and in
carrying out particular projects. Furthermore, Fiat's approach meant taking full advantage11
of other companies' know-how. The firm was not interested in matching the originality of
its competitors unless there were clear-cut commercial reasons for doing so.
Fiat could have manufactured vehicles under a foreign licence, imported chassis from
France, or opted for complete technological independence. However, it chose to strike a
balance between experiment and imitation, picking up new ideas from its more technically
advanced competitors. From the outset, Fiat bought foreign vehicles, took them apart, and
then copied them. The firm therefore took the most promising solutions found in foreign
vehicles, keeping Fiat's technology where this yielded gave better operational results. The
firm's creative copying policy produced optimum results which were swiftly reflected in the
company's products.  Fiat's success in sporting events (first in Italy and later abroad) bore
eloquent witness to the effectiveness of this strategy and the company's cars competed
directly with leading European and American makes. The company's capacity to break into
foreign markets grew as it chalked up more competition victories. As a result, Fiat's exports
rose steadily.
Education and training
Education is a key factor in the development of modern companies since it helps turn
out well-prepared technical and managerial staff. During the first decades of the 20
th
century, industrial education addressed two basic issues: (1) the degree to which the
technical training of the time was capable of contributing to the development of the
metallurgical industry, and (2) the scope for improving the skills of workers and apprentices
at their workplaces.  Below, we will look at some of the observations which were made at
the First National Congress of Metalworking Industries, held in 1913
19.  First we will
examine the situation regarding the acquisition of industrial skills in Spain.  Unlike12
elsewhere in Europe, where large numbers of workers were required, Spanish companies
did not employ special workshops-schools to impart the skills needed by workers in a
modern metal working industry.  Such schools carefully selected budding apprentices who
had to pass a rigorous entrance examination. Apprentices also had to pass a probationary
period lasting between three and six months before signing their indenture papers.  This
apprenticeship system was organised according to the needs of each craft skill and lasted
between four, six, or eight half year courses. The salary increased on completion of each
course until qualification, at which point the apprentice was put on the official scale.  The
relative absence of qualified workers led to  the business failure of many metal working
activities. The majority of modern metal working and mechanical techniques require an
enormous range of skills and prior training. This knowledge covered handling of different
types of steel; the maintenance and use of modern machine tools: applying systems for
calibrating and controlling tolerances; modern transport and lifting systems: electrical
applications, all of which were vital in an increasingly mechanised environment.  There was
little use in having  modern state-of-the-art factories without skilled workers to run them
properly.  This need for a trained workforce implied a very different kind of education
from that received by Spanish workers. Nevertheless, there were plans to set up workshop-
schools and organise an apprenticeship system with the aim of reaping the benefits of these
initiatives in under 10 years.
In addition to the system of training apprentices and highly skilled workers, one should
also consider industrial teachers and workshop heads.  The first group were selected for
their management and organisational skills.  However the second group required greater,
more complex training, given that they were responsible for supervising teachers and
therefore needed to know the work and special skills of their staff  inside out.  Training of
this latter group therefore incorporated engineering knowledge of a more practical nature.
2013
In order to modernise industry, it was necessary to correct the educational system’s
excessive emphasis on theoretical science at the expense of applied science by setting up a
system of higher technical colleges similar to those which had long operated in
industrialised countries.  The second defect of higher education was its attempt to provide
a broad-based education at the expense of specialisation.  In this context, one should note
the Spanish Government’s long-standing failure to deal with educational problems. This
lack of interest manifested itself in the slender public resources earmarked for promoting
the applied sciences.  This contrasted with the active role played by the German
government in incorporating new bodies of knowledge and implementing the necessary
reorganisation of the educational system. One should also bear in mind that metalworking
technology, like computing science today, was essentially based on practical experience
gained in the use of products, machines, and components.  In the German model,
universities acted as depositories of scientific and technological knowledge, providing
technically trained specialists with new ideas.  These ideas were eagerly picked up and put
into practice by German industry.
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Work organisation and production
Scientific organisation developed slowly in Spanish companies. Spanish entrepreneurs
were highly traditional and their management style was a hangover from the pre-mass
production era when authoritarian methods were adopted in dealing with endless labour
disputes.
22 The First World War had a negligible effect on Spanish companies with regard
to adopting scientific principles of work organisation.  Unlike the combatant nations,
neutral Spain was not forced to maximise industrial output to meet the enormous material
demands made by modern warfare. Experiments in work organisation carried out in14
various Catalan companies during the first decades of the 20th century were not based on
Taylor's methods.
23
Spanish organisational methods, according to Guillén, were eclectic.
24 The main strands
of this eclecticism appeared in Catalonia after 1910 and continued through to 1930.
Businessmen were more interested in keeping the peace in their companies than obtaining
productivity improvements (the period was one of industrial strife in Catalonia) and
consequently the focus was of a humanistic and social reforming nature. In many cases
mass production was rejected in favour of craft methods – a strong contrast with countries
like Germany and the United States, where modern organisational methods were
enthusiastically embraced. Companies were convinced that they could only obtain higher
profits by employing such methods.  A new class of employees sprang into existence in
both countries: technical and organisational staff. Their task was to organise and manage
accounting systems, sales, raw material stocks, semi-finished products, transport,
manufacture, administration, technical offices, and all other aspects making up a modern
industrial company whatever its size.  By contrast, in Spain such ideas were virtually terra
incognita, at least before the First World War.  Modern organisation of a factory involved
comprehensive manufacturing instructions passed down the chain of command so that
everyone knew precisely what he had to do.  The manufacturing specification for each
component was fully detailed, as were the operations involved, the machines and tools to
be employed, the time limits for making each item, tolerances, instructions for supplying
the warehouses, assembly instructions, testing, packaging, transport, ensuring orders were
met, checking machine performance, instituting productivity incentives, time and motion
studies, etc. Suggestion schemes  were instituted involving engineering, teaching, and
management staff. In a nutshell, a rigorous system of control and inspection was applied at
every level of the company and affected all its activities.
2515
Proper work organisation and use of modern machinery meant knowing each and every
stage of the production process inside out, the number of repeated operations involved,
and the time taken and the components required to meet production targets. This scientific
organisation of production processes was only possible where rigorous work specialisation
was adopted. However, Spanish companies considered manufacture to involve a
hodgepodge  of processes and failed to establish qualitative or quantitative criteria, define
the links between each stage, or demand tightly defined performance characteristics of their
machines, operatives, or output. In such circumstances it was extremely difficult to invest
in proper plant and equipment. Even where modern factories were provided, Spanish
output and performance was poor.
26 Management innovation elsewhere was the result of
organisational requirements stemming from standardisation, rationalisation, and
measurement which were developed in and adopted by companies of all sizes.
The case of the “Iberia” car company
The Iberia motor company provides a representative case of an entrepreneurial venture
which failed to outlive the early days of the car industry.  When the car industry entered a
boom in the 1920s, the field was still largely unexploited in Spain.  Foreign makes invaded
the Spanish market, taking advantage of low levels of domestic production.  There was an
enormous range of vehicles among foreign makes, but the sector for small economy cars
was entirely dominated by manufacturers from abroad.  In 1914, the Iberia company saw
the opportunity of entering the market for small cheap vehicles.  The owners thought that
a completely Spanish vehicle would cope better with local roads.  The choice of vehicle for
starting the business during the first year was a small lightweight car powered by a 12-15
HP engine. The specifications included: a sheet metal chassis providing bodywork16
dimensions of  220 x 70, a single block four cylinder motor (75mm bore), compressor
valves, 1650 revolutions, “Zenit” automatic carburettor, Bosch ignition, siphon type water
cooling, four forward gears and one reverse, forged steel front axle with ball bearing wheel
mountings, double coupling drive shaft, metal hubs ( 760x90mm) and tyres (810x90mm).
The vehicle was to be built and assembled in series of 12 to 24 units at the very minimum,
with "torpedo" style bodywork, four seats, and an option to buy just the chassis should the
customer so wish. The chassis reached a maximum speed of 90 kilometres per hour on the
flat in a trip between Paris and Barcelona and made the journey in 36 hours.  The vehicle
was aimed at salesman, businessmen, doctors, etc and the chassis could easily take different
types of bodywork, depending on whether it was to be used in city or rural areas.  Its fuel
consumption was a modest nine litres of petrol and one litre of oil per 100 kilometres.
Iberia was constituted with a capital of half a million Pesetas, comprising 1000 shares of
500 Pesetas each, 10 per cent of which was paid up on subscription, a further 40 per cent
payable on receipt of the shares, and the remaining 50 cent over five years at 10 per cent a
year.  Distribution of profits was to be made from a fixed reserve fund constituting up to a
third of the company’s share capital. The dividend was set at eight per cent. Of the reserve
remaining after payment of dividends, 10 per cent was to be paid to the Company Board
and four per cent to the Managing Director.
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The company's plans for manufacturing utility vehicles comprised various stages. The
initial phase covered the first year of the company's existence, in which its activities were
limited to vehicle assembly.  To this end, various agreements were struck with Spanish and
foreign companies for the building of vehicle components to specifications and drawings
provided by Iberia’s Head Engineer.  The company merely carried out assembly and final
adjustments. This strategy provided significant advantages for the company.  It meant Iberia
could test the water without having to invest in expensive machinery. In addition, the17
Company Board could exercise effective control over the business and map out growth
strategies for the following years.  The company took further precautions to ensure a
stream of income and reduce the risk of bankruptcy: i.e. they received pre-payment on sales
and settled up with suppliers later. The motor company’s organisation was extremely
simple and there was no separation between ownership and management, both being in the
hands of the Company Board.  On the technical side, the company had an experienced
Head Engineer who had worked at a big factory in Paris.
During the first year, the company premises were limited to rented space sufficient to
assemble 24 vehicles a year.  The Head Engineer himself checked the components for the
first 50 units supplied by foreign manufacturers before these items were dispatched to
Spain. This was to ensure there would be no problems in subsequent assembly operations.
Iberia's orders to its suppliers were made through written contracts with a commitment to
an initial series of 50 vehicles - the number needed to ensure target retail prices could be
met.  The pricing structure was calculated to provide profits on this volume. Moreover, the
company stipulated that components were to be supplied once sufficient were available for
12 vehicles. This strategy helped generate rapid profits and ensure high market penetration.
Both objectives would have been impossible if the company had undertaken manufacture
of the whole vehicle during the first year of its existence.
Sales were made through a network of dealers, with representatives in each of Spain's
provincial capitals.  Each dealer was required to sell the company's vehicles at a low price
and to meet annual sales targets for cars and chassis, set in accordance with the size of each
provincial capital.  However, dealers were not obliged to keep vehicles if they failed to sell
them, given that Iberia only charged them a very small percentage on unsold cars.  The idea
was that dealers would feel a moral commitment to sell the vehicles.  In addition, Iberia
supplied tyres, parts, and accessories at cost price.  Dealers distributed vehicles through a18
network covering the 49 provincial capitals, with one dealer per province, except in Madrid
and Barcelona (with five each) and Bilbao, Seville and Valencia (two each).  The objective
was to establish competition between these cities and to appoint a regional representative
at the end of the first financial year. This representative would receive direct and indirect
commissions on all sales made in his region.  Lastly, dealers committed themselves to
selling the following numbers of vehicles: Madrid 20; Toledo, Guadalajara, Cuenca y
Ciudad Real, 2 each; Barcelona 20; Tarragona, Lleida and Girona  3 each; Bilbao 6; Vitoria
3; San Sebastián 4; Seville 6; other provinces in Andalusia 2 each; Valencia 6; Palma de
Mallorca 5; and other Spanish provinces, 2 or 3 each – a  grand total of 161 cars.
In addition, Iberia provided help to dealers through large scale advertising campaigns,
promotional material, forms, price lists, etc. There was a big advertising drive in Madrid
and Barcelona which brought in orders for half the annual sales target. In choosing regional
representatives, the company took into account initiatives by dealers in, say, setting up a
taxi company using Iberia’s vehicles. In addition to the 12-15 HP car, the company also sold
various types of trucks ranging from one to five tons. Iberia had reached agreement with a
foreign factory specialising in goods vehicles and the trucks were sent to Spain in knocked
down state and assembled by Iberia. The vehicles were modified slightly and bore the Iberia
name – a badging policy designed to pave the way for production of the company’s own
trucks.19
3. LOST OPPORTUNITIES AND STATE HELP (1918-1930)
Organising production
Spanish companies, particularly  Hispano Suiza, were well-placed to escape from the
vicious circle mentioned earlier. The war gave a new impetus to the motor industry. On the
one hand, new companies sprang into existence, often as a result of transforming
mechanical workshops or using industrial infrastructure hitherto unrelated to the motor
industry. On the other hand, a series of changes took place in existing companies (like
Elizalde) which invested large sums in plant and equipment and expanded factories.
Nevertheless, according to Calvo, these investments were not the fruit of careful planning
but rather the result of improvisation to deal with the drying up of supplies from war-torn
Belgium. It is worth noting that  Elizalde carried out Taylor-inspired changes to its
production methods as well as spending money on plant.
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Between 1914 and 1918, Spanish metalworking companies extended their premises,
bought new machines, modernised their plant, and achieved substantial increases in output.
The Spanish metalworking industry in general, and the Catalan one in particular, underwent
a profound change between 1913 and 1918. Nevertheless, despite plant acquisitions and
the general rise in production, the industry was still poorly placed to withstand foreign
competition. Metal manufactures had more than doubled in price compared to 1914,
despite the fact that tariffs remained unchanged until May 1921. Worse still, cost prices
abroad had fallen more quickly than in Spain, not only because of cheaper raw materials
but also because of shifts in the exchange rate. The new tariff structure hit the Spanish
mechanical sector hard, with about 40% of production affected. Manufacturers therefore20
sought greater Government protection and pursued co-operation agreements with other
companies. These measures were thus designed to re-erect tariff barriers on the one hand,
and to cut production costs by grouping manufacturers on the other.
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Spanish support for the industry strengthened throughout the 1920s. Several plants
turning out both cars and industrial vehicles were set up, encouraged by protectionist
legislation. Many other component companies sprang up, gradually underpinning Spain’s
incipient motor industry. The industry’s painfully slow development up until that point can
be attributed to several causes. One of these was the country’s lack of special steels.
Virtually all car components used them and substitution with other types of steel was
simply not a viable option. There were also few companies producing special components
such as electrical equipment, radiators, carburettor, headlights, etc., most of which had to
be imported. Indeed, manufacture of these components did not begin until the late 1920s
and then only thanks to demand from Ford and General  Motors’ Spanish subsidiaries.
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 Despite the above-mentioned problems, many manufacturers considered it worthwhile
entering the Spanish motor industry since Spain had (at least in the beginning) all the raw
materials needed to make vehicles: bauxite for aluminium, iron copper, chrome, nickel, and
vanadium for making special steels;  water power;  electricity to heat kilns, and skilled
workers. However, the country’s mining and metalworking industries also suffered from
serious weaknesses: high prices, poor quality, low stocks, and problems in transporting
supplies whether by land or sea. It is worth mentioning that these raw materials were 50 to
70 per cent dearer than in other European markets due to freight costs, customs duties,
insurance, port fees, unloading costs, and a host of other expenses. Not surprisingly,
Spanish companies found it very difficult to compete on equal terms with foreign
companies whose raw materials were not subject to such heavy duties and costs.
31 As if this
were not enough, the Government also put punitive taxes on petrol.
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While machine building reached a considerable scale in Barcelona, manufacturers were
rarely able to specialise in particular areas simply because the market was such a thin one
and there were few opportunities for competing abroad. The small market size meant short
production runs which thus deterred investment in plant which might otherwise have
increased profits by exploiting economies of scale. The virtual impossibility of specialising
led mechanical workshops to diversify but this strategy was still based on short production
runs. Local factories therefore found themselves very badly placed to compete in
international markets. The need to import certain products like cast iron and steel
components, as well as raw materials put domestic manufacturers at a further disadvantage.
High Spanish customs duties on both semi-finished items and raw materials effectively
prevented certain types of manufacturing activity. Hence, machine-builders adapted to
circumstances rather than moulding them, setting up workshops to meet the specific needs
of the moment. Most of these workshops were set up in dilapidated old buildings, some of
which were rehabilitated for the purpose. Very few new workshops were built to meet
modern manufacturing requirements.
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The setting up of large scale motor industries in Spain was beset by seemingly
insuperable difficulties in the first thirty years of the 20
th century. There were simply no
companies in a position to supply purpose-built precision machinery or sufficient special
components. Given that no manufacturer had dared specialise in machine tools and related
items (calibres, assembly jigs, templates, tools) these had to be imported in large quantities.
Very few motor companies had precision machine tools and those that had  them needed
more.
By contrast, motor companies in the leading European countries grew from the simple
workshops of the early days to larger factories, although without implementing the mass
production techniques employed by Ford. Model development occurred through22
successive modifications carried out at various production stages until the product
matured. However, Spanish start up companies (which seldom used foreign patents) simply
could not afford to spend the same amount of time and money on vehicle design, testing,
and modifications as their foreign rivals. These companies, most of which were founded
before the First World War, gradually developed and perfected their products.
Another important factor to bear in mind is that the appearance of some of the first
motor companies was strongly linked to activities in related areas, particularly the
manufacture, assembly, and repair of bicycles.
34 The know-how gained from bicycle
manufacture, commercialisation, and distribution stood such companies in very good stead
when they started making motor vehicles. Yet in Catalonia, the centre of the Spanish motor
industry, there was no bicycle industry worthy of the name.
The inter-war period marked the establishment of multinational subsidiaries in Spain.
Various foreign companies decided to set up in there in the 1920s given the combination
of a growing market and weak domestic producers. These companies started up with
assembly operations in Free Port areas. The two most important examples of this approach
were the Ford and General Motors factories, both based in Barcelona, and the Fiat-Hispania
factory in Guadalajara.
35 Ford set up in Cadiz in 1920 before moving its operations to
Barcelona in 1923. GM first established a factory in Malaga and, like Ford, had second
thoughts and moved to Barcelona. Fiat set up in Spain in 1919 through its subsidiary Fiat
Hispania and the Italian company won a large share of the market in the 1920s. A surge in
customs duties in July 1930 made Fiat decide to go into a joint venture with local
manufacturers - Hispano-Suiza, and Pescara y Ricart – to set up a factory in Barcelona. Ford
Motor Ibérica was founded shortly before this in 1929, with 40% of its share capital in local
hands. These initiatives benefited from the tax deductions conceded by the Government
for vehicles assembled in Spain using local components. Fiat, unlike the American23
companies, decided to set up in Guadalajara rather than Barcelona. According to Bigazzi,
the reason for this decision lay in the wave of labour disputes that swept Barcelona
following the proclamation of the Spanish Republic in 1931. Fiat reorganised Hispano’s
factory in Guadalajara which had hitherto produced trucks and the modified plant was
tooled up to produce the 514 model. The initial production was only two to three hundred
vehicles a year. After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, the factory was
dismantled and moved to Valencia.
36 Mention should also be made of Chrysler, which
presented a project to assemble cars in Spain employing a high proportion of local
components and raw materials. Lastly, there was  Sociedad Española de  Construcción Naval,
founded in 1929, which built trucks in its workshops in Sestao (Vizcaya), in partnership
with two other companies:  Somua  and  Sociedad Española de Importadores de Automóviles,
founded in 1936 in Zorroza (Vizcaya) as part of an agreement with Dodge.
In addition to these vehicle manufacturers, there was also an important ancillary
industry. Tyres were made by Spanish subsidiaries of Pirelli, Firestone, Continental and
Michelin. Pirelli set up in Spain at the beginning of the century, building a factory making
electrical conductors in 1902 which was extended to provide tyres and inner tubes for
vehicles in 1907. The factory covered 55,000 square metres, used 1,600 HP of motive
power and employed 1500 staff. The plant belonged to Productos Pirelli, S.A. which, together
with Manresa de Nacional Pirelli S.A., were subsidiaries of Comercial Pirelli, S.A. de Barcelona,
which was in turn owned by Pirelli y Cía. de Milán, through Compagnie International Pirelli in
Brussels. Firestone’s Spanish subsidiary, Firestone Hispania, S.A., opened a tyre factory in
Basauri (Vizcaya province) in July 1933 which covered 52,000 square metres. The main
building was 250 metres long, 30 metres, and 12 metres high. Three years later, Continental
built a factory in Torrelavega (Santander province), while Michelin built a plant in Usurbi
(Guipúzcoa province).
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The role of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship
A paper was presented to the Marquis of Estella in December 1925, signed by Ramón
de la Sota, Damián Mateu  and Arturo Elizalde,  in which they set out the parlous state of
the Spanish motor industry and asked the Government to step in and lend support. The
Government’s response was initially favourable and it was decided to set up an inter-
ministerial commission to study the issue prior to calling a special motor industry congress.
The congress was held in the Summer of 1926 and involved all those in the sector. The aim
was to achieve production of a low-priced quality car. General interest in the question led
to the creation of COMA (Official Commission for the Motor Industry). The body had
two functions: (1) ensuring that official entities acquired Spanish vehicles, and (2) inviting
companies to set up factories which fitted in with the Government’s nationalisation policy.
Companies were very lukewarm on the second count and this poor response made the
Government seek other ways of achieving the same end. The outcome was a new
programme whose broad nationalisation aims were to be implemented over eight to ten
years. However, the provisions regarding exclusive use of Spanish raw materials were
planned to take effect in just three years. The plan divided cars into three types: luxury,
middle-range, and cheap. Based on the idea that the Spanish demand for vehicles could
reach some 30,000 vehicles by 1928 (17,000 of which  fell into the cheap category), the
plans envisaged one or two factories turning out luxury vehicles (600 units a year) by June
1927, two factories producing mid-range vehicles (4,000 units a year), and two factories
turning out “people’s cars” (12,000 – 15,000 units a year). One should note that two quite
different organisational approaches were advocated in the Commission – on the one hand
the horizontal organisation put forward by Julio de Renteria, Managing Director of Elizalde25
S.A., and on the other, the vertical organisation proposed by Captain Alejandro Sancho.
The latter view prevailed, appealing as it did to the military minds running the government.
The basic lines of the programme were later followed by another soldier-turned-leader of
industry – Suanzes – during the Franco dictatorship.
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The idea of local factories did not preclude importing foreign vehicles (which still
accounted for the vast bulk of the market). However, the State’s help in setting up plants
did not rely on high tariff barriers alone. These barriers would be of little use if Spanish
companies could not sell their products in the domestic market. The State therefore
adopted “buy Spanish” quotas for government bodies. It was assumed that cars would be
based on foreign designs which by then had won over Spanish customers. The idea was
that these designs would gradually evolve into a more national model under foreign
technical guidance. Companies tendering for car plants had to have at least 75% of their
capital in Spanish hands and the same proportion applied to nationals on the Company
Board which had to include a Spanish CEO and Secretary. Foreign technical staff, workers,
and administrative staff were not allowed to exceed 20% of the total five years after the
company began trading. The strongest national protection was applied to companies
producing the “people’s car” given that the motor might prove useful for agricultural
applications and public transport, etc. Lastly, the State exercised fiscal control but without
interfering in manufacturers’ technical and commercial initiatives. The Government
therefore devoted its efforts almost exclusively to: ensuring the use of genuine Spanish raw
materials and components; making sure quality components were used;  and checking the
vehicle price was in line with the cost of the components employed.
39
Despite the apparent scope of this programme, industry generally enjoyed few practical
benefits from either tariffs or the protectionist legislation. Thus the Spanish car industry
often lost out in international accords, the 1931 agreement with France being a case in26
point and under the terms of which the already low secondary tariffs were further reduced.
Worse still, when it came to fleet purchases, both companies and ministries chose to ferry
their bigwigs around in foreign vehicles.
Nevertheless, the early 1930s saw considerable development in the Spanish motor
industry and various national companies armed either with their own patents or foreign
ones were poised to begin production. Up until then, only fast expensive cars had been
manufactured in the country plus a small number of industrial trucks but now factories for
producing motorcycles, medium-sized cars, vans, and medium and heavy trucks were being
built. The only part of the market left uncovered was that for a cheap “people’s car”.
Unfortunately, plants turning out cheap cars required heavy investment in order to allow
the long production runs needed to bring costs and prices down to reasonable levels.
Greater organisation skills were also needed since the factory staff were not trained in mass
production methods. Despite these problems, it seemed Spain could at last look forward to
manufacturing and exporting its vehicles in the medium term, leaving behind the stigma of
being one of the smallest European vehicle manufacturers with an output of just 325 cars
in 1928.
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The motor industry had begun by making small numbers of luxury vehicles. Although
various attempts were made to make cheap Spanish cars, these all failed, as did attempts to
produce foreign vehicles in larger quantities.
41 Spain turned out just 800 cars and trucks in
1935 and imported over 22,000 vehicles. While there were 180,000 vehicles on the roads, a
figure considered high enough to set up a national factory, no local manufacturer proved
capable of mass-producing cars. 
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4. THE STRATEGIES AND ORGANISATION ADOPTED BY PIONEERING
FIRMS.
The rise, development, and fall of industries is a trait of modern economies. New
companies enter a field while other leave. Some companies grow while others shrink or
disappear altogether. Industries change their structural and organisational features over
time. It is important here to consider how organisation and economic changes work in
terms of  the entry and exit of firms, vertical integration, diversification, the creation of
networks of companies, and the role of public bodies. This paper has analysed a range of
factors which explain the absence of large Spanish motor companies. In the foregoing
sections we looked at the factors – all of them external ones – which shaped the industry in
its early years. The following paragraphs look at the internal aspects of companies and
trends towards industrial concentration, specialisation, diversification, and vertical
integration.
Throughout the first third of the century, practically all of the Spanish companies
pioneering the manufacture of vehicles were set up by entrepreneurs who were more
inspired by wishful thinking than by sound business sense. Their attempts to establish a
thriving motor industry repeatedly failed. Some confined themselves to assembling
components, mainly imported from abroad. This was the case of companies like Díaz y
Grillo, Lorcy, Landa, David y Victoria and later M y A Ricart. Others opted to build their own
vehicles, adopting a vertical organisation which paved the way to failure. This group
included Automóviles España, Elizalde, Talleres Hereter, S.A. de los M. Ricart y Pérez y Ricart,
, Euskalduna, SEFA and others. Another company,  F.N. de A. Pescara
disposed of good technology but failed because of lack of financial resources.
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The fact that all these initiatives enjoyed so little success was largely due to
entrepreneurs’ lack of know-how and their capacity for repeating the mistakes of others.
Put bluntly, their strategies were ill-conceived on a technical, administrative, and financial
level. Entrepreneurs’ sparse technical knowledge and rank amateurism stemmed more from
a wish to make cars bearing their names rather than a desire to make car manufacture a
lucrative business. These entrepreneurs therefore looked at matters from a narrow
viewpoint and jumped into immediate production, thus dooming the venture to
commercial failure. This blinkered approach to business and the market prevented them
from adopting realistic strategies. Most entrepreneurs started with enough capital to set up
a design or project department, but lacked the wherewithal to undertake serial production –
which some foolishly embarked upon as soon as they opened shop. Some even believed
that a vertical organisation guaranteed success, without bothering to create, group, and
promote ancillary industries.
Spanish companies also showed themselves incapable of reaching agreements to
organise different manufacturing activities. One should recall that there were factories
owned by Hispano Suiza, Elizalde, Talleres España, Automóviles Ricart, Euskalduna, and Hispano
Guadalajara, as well as a large number of firms making coachwork, radiators, inner tubes,
tyres, and body panels etc. One of the proposals (made by Elizalde) consisted in grouping
these companies to form a kind of Spanish version of General Motors, formed by: Hispano
Suiza in Ripoll which would make chassis;  Ricart the engines;  Talleres España, motors;
Elizalde, body panels and brakes;  Euskalduna,  steering components; and  Hispano  in
Guadalajara responsible for final assembly. This would have made it easier to attain the
economies of scale needed to turn out serially-produced cars at an attractive price. The
headquarters of the holding was to be responsible for model development and organising
and distributing work between companies, with participating firms and their entrepreneurs29
with stakes in the holding company. The project appeared viable if 1,500 vehicles could be
built (a mere 6% of annual vehicle sales in Spain) at a price of 10,000 Pesetas per unit. The
ideal vehicle specification was a five-seater powered by a 1500 cc (8-10 CV).
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One can say that no Spanish companies capable of taking a substantial slice of the
market appeared on the scene during the period studied in this paper. The structure of
these companies was simply incompatible with large scale production of a cheap runabout.
Although the firms followed different paths, all led to business failure. Even the longest
lasting and possibly best endowed firm - Hispano Suiza - failed to outlive the first phase of
the motor industry in which luxury models were turned out in short series.
As if the business errors committed by entrepreneurs were not enough, there was also
lack of governmental support for the industry. None of the Government’s initiatives bore
fruit, whether it was the Cambó Tariff (the motor industry’s interests were sacrificed in
1923) or the Official Commission on the Motor Industry (which thoroughly examined all
aspects of car production and came up with viable solutions).
5. CONCLUSIONS
At the end of the first third of the century, the Spanish motor industry comprised family
companies turning out short series of vehicles made with little more than craft skills. The
bulk of the Spanish market was dominated by the subsidiaries of multinational companies
assembling imported components.
45 The first family companies to make vehicles set up in
Catalonia. The size of this sector in comparison with the industry as a whole was tiny.
However, its mere existence was proof of  the technical potential available which was not
so different from that in the rest of Europe.
46 Fiat provides an enlightening contrast with
the practices of Spanish manufacturers. The company had focused on economic and30
commercial consideration from the outset,  relegating purely technical aspects to second
place. It had also carried out a process of vertical integration which was entirely new in
Italy. In comparison, the attempts by small Spanish companies at vertical integration were
not only doomed to failure but also presented a grave threat to their commercial survival,
particularly given their chronic under-capitalisation. One way out of this morass would
have been for them to have forged strategic alliances with one another. The formation of a
Spanish motor industry would also have been much easier if various companies had
merged to gain the necessary critical mass.
During the first stage of the industry’s development, the sector was characterised by a
host of small companies and swift technological change. However, a dominant design
emerged later and entry barriers grew ever higher as economies of scale and capitalisation
became increasingly important. The modest initial technical requirements grew stiffer and
the learning curve became steeper for new entrants, thus giving the biggest companies in
the sector a virtually unassailable lead over would-be competitors. Finally the sector ended
up with just a few large companies.
47 In Spain local initiatives did not get beyond the first
stage of the industry’s development.   As Sudrià comments, there were plenty of
entrepreneurs and business ventures holding out bright prospects. Nevertheless, “what was
lacking was the social and economic structure to facilitate the expansion of these
companies.”
48 Unfortunately, another vital ingredient missing from this heady brew was a
sound business strategy.31
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